Piece
Sighed by Adm R A Ry
Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax,Navy Office WW1, WW11
Piece Size 4 ¾ by 1 ¾ inches Personally Signed by Admiral
Sir Reginald Aylmer Ranfurly Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax, KCB, DSO, JP, DL (né Plunkett; 28
August 1880 – 16 October 1967), commonly known as Sir Reginald Plunkett
or Sir Reginald Drax, was an Anglo-Irish admiral. The younger son of the 17th Baron of
Dunsany, he was Director of the Royal Naval Staff
College, Preside Staff College, Camberley, to conduct an
in-depth study of the subject of staff training and its application.
In
1909, the Admiralty published his book, Modern Naval
Tactics. He hoped that it would contribute to a projected official tactical
handbook. It drew on an analysis of gunnery from the recent experience of the Battle of Tsushima. He expected that visibility
in the North Sea
would limit the maximum range of battle fleet duels to 10,000 yards, but
recognised that the need to stay outside improving torpedo
range would increase gunnery ranges.
He
also discussed in the book how to utilise cruisers as a fast wing to the battle
fleet; the possible tactics of an inferior fleet, such as the High Seas
Fleet; and the impact of ships zigzagging
would have on gunnery.
The Times
obituary claimed that Drax's book was dismissed by the sceptical older
generation of admirals, who thought it highly presumptuous for a lowly
lieutenant to write with authority on naval tactics. However, the book did
succeed in making Drax a man of note. In 1912, when Winston
Churchill instituted the Admiralty War Staff, Drax was the first of 15
officers selected to attend the new staff officer course. He was promoted to
commander during the course and then appointed War Staff Officer to Sir David Beatty in the 1st Battlecruiser Squadron, an appointment
he held until his promotion in 1916.
He
served during the First World War aboard the battlecruiser
HMS Lion
and was present at the naval battles of Heligoland Bight, Dogger Bank and Jutland.
He was promoted captain on 30 June 1916.
He was
awarded the Distinguished Service Order in 1918 for
his command of HMS Blanche.
Drax
retired in 1938, but was brought out of retirement by the First Sea Lord,
Admiral Roger Backhouse as the best man to plan out how
to execute the Singapore strategy. In the event of a threat
from Japan, British planning called to send out a strong Royal Navy force to Singapore,
the main British naval base in Asia, to hopefully deter Japan from war or to be
ready to confront the Imperial Japanese Navy in the South China Sea if war
should come. Backhouse felt that the increasing aggressive Japanese behaviour
as demonstrated by the Second Sino-Japanese War made it
imperative to finally work out how to best implement the Singapore strategy[
Backhouse's plans to execute the Singapore strategy had called for sending a
force of five or four battleships to Singapore, but Drax changed the Singapore
strategy by calling for a "flying squadron" to be sent to Singapore
with more forces to go east if necessary. A memo stated: "Drax favoured
relying on small, mobile forces to deter the Japanese from interfering and
overrunning British interests in the Far East. Drax felt that a "flying
squadron" of two battleships or battlecruisers, an aircraft carrier, a
cruiser squadron, and a destroyer flotilla would be ideal for this
purpose".
In
addition, Drax called for another aircraft carrier to be sent to the Indian
Ocean for the protection of both Australia and India. Drax's plans called for
the "flying squadron" to confront the Japanese fleet in the South
China Sea while he also called for another force to be stationed in Singapore
that was to consist of 8 cruisers, 17 destroyers, 15 submarines, 12 motor torpedo
boats, and two minelayers for the protection of the trade routes and for the defence
of Singapore itself. Drax admitted that his plan would require the British to
stay on the defensive on the account of the numerical superiority of the
Japanese Navy and it would be impossible to deliver a "knock-out
blow" against Japan with the forces envisioned. Drax wrote that the Royal
Navy would be able to take the offensive against the Imperial Japanese Navy
only in the event of more British naval forces to be sent to Singapore and/or
if the United States was involved, stating a combined Anglo-American fleet
would have the necessary numbers to take the offensive against Japan. Drax
argued that Britain needed control of the Mediterranean
Sea both to supply and reinforce the forces in Singapore and to
allow the necessary numbers to take on Japan. Believing that Benito Mussolini
would try to take advantage of Britain being engaged in a war with Germany
and/or Japan, Drax called for the Royal Navy to deliver a "knock-out
blow" against the Regia Marina first before turning east to focus
on Japan. Drax noted that the location of Italy in the central Mediterranean
required any British naval forces going east to enter the Suez canal on the way
to Singapore to first sail past Italy, which led him to argue that the Regia
Marina had to be eliminated first to execute the Singapore strategy.
Drax argued that in the event of war, the Japanese would try to capture Singapore. Drax argued that there were two ways that the Japanese would come, namely the "direct approach" of a landing at Singapore or the "step-by-step approach" of first capturing Hong Kong and Brunei as the prelude to taking Singapore. Drax argued that the defences of Singapore had to be strengthened to prevent the "direct approach" while in the case of the "step-by-step approach", British aircraft, submarines and light vessels should try to interdict Japanese ships in the South China Sea. Finally, Drax argued that the battleships of the "flying squadron" should be of the modern Queen Elizabeth class, which he felt to be the best battleships to face the Imperial Navy Drax wrote that the "superior training" of the Royal Navy's crews would make the decisive difference while he used the Japanese obsession with secrecy as almost nothing was known about the latest warships of the Imperial Navy other than that they existed, which led him to argue that it was quite possible that the Japanese warships were inferior. Details & Photo enclosed
The Piece is in Good Condition
Post and Packing reduction for multiple purchases
please see other items and check feedback for quality of service
Member Philatelic Trades Society PTS
Customs and handling
fees
Here are the customs
and handling fees for your chosen package items and destination. These will
show in your basket when you checkout.
EU Customs fee £2.56,
Handling fee, £1.00, Total fees £3.56