Piece Sighed by Adm R A Ry Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax,Navy Office WW1, WW11

Piece Size 4 ¾ by 1 ¾ inches Personally Signed by Admiral Sir Reginald Aylmer Ranfurly Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax, KCB, DSO, JP, DL (né Plunkett; 28 August 1880 – 16 October 1967), commonly known as Sir Reginald Plunkett or Sir Reginald Drax, was an Anglo-Irish admiral.  The younger son of the 17th Baron of Dunsany, he was Director of the Royal Naval Staff College, Preside Staff College, Camberley, to conduct an in-depth study of the subject of staff training and its application.

In 1909, the Admiralty published his book, Modern Naval Tactics. He hoped that it would contribute to a projected official tactical handbook. It drew on an analysis of gunnery from the recent experience of the Battle of Tsushima. He expected that visibility in the North Sea would limit the maximum range of battle fleet duels to 10,000 yards, but recognised that the need to stay outside improving torpedo range would increase gunnery ranges.

He also discussed in the book how to utilise cruisers as a fast wing to the battle fleet; the possible tactics of an inferior fleet, such as the High Seas Fleet; and the impact of ships zigzagging would have on gunnery.

The Times obituary claimed that Drax's book was dismissed by the sceptical older generation of admirals, who thought it highly presumptuous for a lowly lieutenant to write with authority on naval tactics. However, the book did succeed in making Drax a man of note. In 1912, when Winston Churchill instituted the Admiralty War Staff, Drax was the first of 15 officers selected to attend the new staff officer course. He was promoted to commander during the course and then appointed War Staff Officer to Sir David Beatty in the 1st Battlecruiser Squadron, an appointment he held until his promotion in 1916.

He served during the First World War aboard the battlecruiser HMS Lion and was present at the naval battles of Heligoland Bight, Dogger Bank and Jutland. He was promoted captain on 30 June 1916.

He was awarded the Distinguished Service Order in 1918 for his command of HMS Blanche.

Drax retired in 1938, but was brought out of retirement by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Roger Backhouse as the best man to plan out how to execute the Singapore strategy. In the event of a threat from Japan, British planning called to send out a strong Royal Navy force to Singapore, the main British naval base in Asia, to hopefully deter Japan from war or to be ready to confront the Imperial Japanese Navy in the South China Sea if war should come. Backhouse felt that the increasing aggressive Japanese behaviour as demonstrated by the Second Sino-Japanese War made it imperative to finally work out how to best implement the Singapore strategy[ Backhouse's plans to execute the Singapore strategy had called for sending a force of five or four battleships to Singapore, but Drax changed the Singapore strategy by calling for a "flying squadron" to be sent to Singapore with more forces to go east if necessary. A memo stated: "Drax favoured relying on small, mobile forces to deter the Japanese from interfering and overrunning British interests in the Far East. Drax felt that a "flying squadron" of two battleships or battlecruisers, an aircraft carrier, a cruiser squadron, and a destroyer flotilla would be ideal for this purpose".

In addition, Drax called for another aircraft carrier to be sent to the Indian Ocean for the protection of both Australia and India. Drax's plans called for the "flying squadron" to confront the Japanese fleet in the South China Sea while he also called for another force to be stationed in Singapore that was to consist of 8 cruisers, 17 destroyers, 15 submarines, 12 motor torpedo boats, and two minelayers for the protection of the trade routes and for the defence of Singapore itself. Drax admitted that his plan would require the British to stay on the defensive on the account of the numerical superiority of the Japanese Navy and it would be impossible to deliver a "knock-out blow" against Japan with the forces envisioned. Drax wrote that the Royal Navy would be able to take the offensive against the Imperial Japanese Navy only in the event of more British naval forces to be sent to Singapore and/or if the United States was involved, stating a combined Anglo-American fleet would have the necessary numbers to take the offensive against Japan. Drax argued that Britain needed control of the Mediterranean Sea both to supply and reinforce the forces in Singapore and to allow the necessary numbers to take on Japan. Believing that Benito Mussolini would try to take advantage of Britain being engaged in a war with Germany and/or Japan, Drax called for the Royal Navy to deliver a "knock-out blow" against the Regia Marina first before turning east to focus on Japan. Drax noted that the location of Italy in the central Mediterranean required any British naval forces going east to enter the Suez canal on the way to Singapore to first sail past Italy, which led him to argue that the Regia Marina had to be eliminated first to execute the Singapore strategy.

Drax argued that in the event of war, the Japanese would try to capture Singapore. Drax argued that there were two ways that the Japanese would come, namely the "direct approach" of a landing at Singapore or the "step-by-step approach" of first capturing Hong Kong and Brunei as the prelude to taking Singapore. Drax argued that the defences of Singapore had to be strengthened to prevent the "direct approach" while in the case of the "step-by-step approach", British aircraft, submarines and light vessels should try to interdict Japanese ships in the South China Sea. Finally, Drax argued that the battleships of the "flying squadron" should be of the modern Queen Elizabeth class, which he felt to be the best battleships to face the Imperial Navy Drax wrote that the "superior training" of the Royal Navy's crews would make the decisive difference while he used the Japanese obsession with secrecy as almost nothing was known about the latest warships of the Imperial Navy other than that they existed, which led him to argue that it was quite possible that the Japanese warships were inferior. Details & Photo enclosed

 

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