But while Quine's program of naturalization called the attention of philosophers to empirical psychology, his conception of psychology was inspired by an austere behaviorism which shunned the mentalism of intentional psychology in the Brentanian and phenomenological tradition.
The papers collected here had their origin in a conference held in Montreal, 1-3 June 1995. The conference drew together researchers of all persuasions, from Europe and North America, to discuss the philosophy of mind. The volume is divided into four sections, each section being prefaced by a specific introduction. The first section deals mainly with the problem of consciousness in relation to intentionality. The second section's main topic is the problem of "qualia", a notion closely related to phenomenal consciousness, approached in the context of perception. The last two sections raise several problems related to what has been called "folk psychology".
1: Intentionality and Consciousness.- State Consciousness Revisited.- Conscious Intentionality.- Intentionality, Consciousness and the System's Perspective.- Consciousness as valued procedural mode of apprehension.- 2: Qualia and Perception.- The Colors and Shapes of Visual Experiences.- Qualia and Representations.- Filling-in: Visual Science and the Philosophy of Perception.- Perception, Particulars and Predicates.- 3: Content Ascription.- Pretense in Prediction: Simulation and Understanding Minds.- Pragmatic Aspects of Content Determination.- On the Principle of Charity and the Sources of Indeterminacy.- Davidson, Indeterminacy, and Measurement.- 4: Intentional Causation and Content Individuation.- Davidson on Intentional Causation.- Externalism, Dedicto Beliefs, Proper Names and Reference Determination.- Two Concepts of Belief.- References.
Philosophy of mind has been one of the most active fields in philosophy for the past three decades. One of the most significant factors in the development of this discipline has been the emergence of cognitive science and the interest philosophers have taken in the empirical study of mind. Another equally important factor has been the "naturalistic tum" brought about by W. V. Quine. His proposal that normative epistemology be replaced by empirical psychology marked a radical departure from the Fregean "anti