British Intelligence in the Second World War Vol. 5: History of the Second World War book by Michael Howard : Immediate dispatch from Somerset. Nice book in great condition. Pages in excellent condition. No notes or highlighting. See images. Fantastic book.

Format: Hardcover

Author: Michael Howard

ISBN: 9780521401456

Condition: Used - Very Good


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About the book >.>.> All surprise rests upon concealment, and 'security' is one of the classi- cal 'principles of war'. But few intelligent commanders have been satis- fied simply with concealing their intentions or their strength. The commander who wishes to impose his will on the enemy which is, after all, the object of all military operations will seek also to deceive him; to implant in the adversary's mind an erroneous image which will not only help to conceal his true capabilities and intentions but will lead that adversary to act in such a way as to make his own task easier. If he is weak he will seek to give an appearance of strength that will deter his adversary from attacking. If an attack is clearly inevi- table he may try to manipulate it by giving a false impression of weakness at a particular point well prepared to defend itself, and of strength at one which is not. If he is taking the offensive he will try to weaken the enemy at the point chosen for the attack by feints at other parts of the front. He will, in short, try to get inside the mind of the enemy commander, assess that commander's appreciation of the position on both sides, and then provide for the enemy, through all available chan- nels, the information that will lead him to make the dispositions which will best conform to his own plan. It is not enough to persuade the enemy to think something: it is necessary to persuade him to do something. The object of deception no less than of military operations is to affect the actions of the adversary. Deception thus demands not only good security, but also good intelli- gence. These are the two pillars on which all deceptive activity must be based. One can affect a person's actions only if one understands their motivations or, as Field Marshal Montgomery used to put it, 'what makes them tick. The contribution of good information to this under- standing is self-evident, but no less important is that of good psychology -a commodity not always available in equal abundance. At the lowest tactical levels, especially in confrontation with an adversary of similar (LL)